## The evolving landscape of payment systems October 14 – 15, 2014 Mexico City

# How to measure the unsecured money market? The Eurosystem implementation and validation using TARGET2 data

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Joint work with Cristina Picillo, Francesco Vacirca (Banca d'Italia), Ronald Heijmans and Richard Heuver (De Nederlandsche Bank) and Marco Massarenti (ECB) The views expressed in this presentation and in the related papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank, Banca d'Italia or De Nederlandsche Bank. Any errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.

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2	Money market trades
3	Eurosystem implementation
4	Validation
5	Paradise lost?

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### Why do payment system people care for money market?

Borrowing from other banks through the **money market** is one of the possible funding sources in a **RTGS** system, the others being:

- balances maintained on accounts with the central bank;
- daylight credit from the central bank;
- incoming payments.

Money market trades "... can only serve to redistribute funds already within the system, although that may nevertheless make an important contribution to reducing the reliance on banks' reserve balances and central bank credit extensions..." (BIS, RTGS Report, 1997)

Then, we do expect a negative impact of a freeze in the money market on RTGS functioning...

but after Lehman default, several money markets were stressed across the world while RTGS systems continued to work smoothly

It is because of CBs injecting additional liquidity in the system and banks' desks adapting their liquidity management strategies

Therefore, it is not immediate to evaluate the impact of a shrinkage in the money market on RTGS performance on the basis of actual data

# After all, it is still the same old story of the Milton Friedman's thermostat.. (with some adaptations of my own)


If a house has a good thermostat, we should observe a strong negative correlation between the amount of gas burned in the boiler (**Monetary base**), and the outside temperature (**Money market trades**). Furthermore, we should observe no correlation between the amount of gas burned in the boiler (**Monetary base**) and the inside temperature (**RTGS performance**) and - again - no correlation between the outside temperature (**Money market trades**) and the inside temperature (**RTGS performance**) and the inside temperature (**RTGS performance**). Within a counterfactual exercise using a simulator tool like the BoF-PSS2 simulator, it is possible to replicate a number of operational days in the life of RTGS systems with different money market conditions, keeping constant the central and commercial banks behaviour (i.e. the gas burned in the boiler)

E.g. such an analysis has been carried out for the Italian component of TARGET2 after the Lehman default by Arciero (2009) showing that a reduction in the level of money market flows may turn out into effects of similar magnitude, albeit milder, to those triggered by an analogue reduction of cash balances

But we need to know the money market trades settled in the RTGS system

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### Money market trades -1/3




In an RTGS system, TARGET2 for the euro area, there will be two payments:

- Tuesday 1 October, Lara -> Fred EUR 100,000,000.00
- Friday 4 October, Fred -> Lara EUR 100,001,083.33

Loan amount, agreed annualized rate and maturity lead to accrued amount

Rates lie (usually) around EONIA

Identification of overnight money market trades in payment systems data by means of the Furfine (1999) algorithm:



### Fedwire (US)

Furfine (1999), Furfine (2001), Demiralp *et al.* (2004), Afonso *et al.* (2011), Armantier and Copeland (2012), Kuo *et al.* (2013), ...

### CHAPS (UK)

Millard and Polenghi (2004), Whetherilt et al. (2010), Jurgilas and Žikeš (2012), ...

#### Other payment systems

Hendry and Kamhi (2007) – Canadian LVTS Akram and Christophersen (2010) – Norwegian NBO Heijmans *et al.* (2010) – TARGET2-NL Arciero (2012) - TARGET2-BdI

How to measure the unsecured money market?

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#### Aim

Developing a database for the whole euro area serving multiple purposes: oversight, financial stability, monetary policy

#### Maturities

Maturities up to three months reliably estimated (with a high degree of uncertainty also maturities from three months to one year)

#### Validation

"Furfine" algorithm validated for the first time with subsections of the whole euro area money market data (e-MID and EONIA)


#### Data

- a. Only bank-to-bank payments and selected ancillary systems transactions
- b. Removing intra-group transaction using Group BIC consolidation based on SWIFT directory
- c. Initial limitation due to the missing ordering and beneficiary information

#### Loan and increment

- a. Minimum loan value, EUR 1 million
- b. Loan increments depending on loan values

### Eurosystem implementation -2/6



#### Corridors

- a. ECB corridor (Overnight Deposit and Marginal Lending)
- b. ECB corridor  $\pm$  25 bps (OD-25 bps and ML+25 bps)
- c. EONIA/EURIBOR  $\pm$  25 bps
- d. EONIA/EURIBOR  $\pm$  50 bps
- e. EONIA/EURIBOR  $\pm$  100 bps

#### Plausible interest rates

a. Must be within corridor

#### b. Only interest rates rounded to $\frac{1}{2}$ basis points are considered plausible

How to measure the unsecured money market?


#### Multiple matches

- a. Multiple matches possible (matched loan not taken out)
- b. Most plausible duration will be chosen on number of unique matches per duration
- c. Information on choice is kept in the final dataset


#### Maximum durations

- a. Up to 3 months reliably estimated
- b. Loans with maturity from 3 to 12 months to be interpreted with caution

### Eurosystem implementation – 5/6



### Eurosystem implementation – 6/6



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#### Cross-check with e-MID data

- a. Italian electronic money market system for all maturities, with participation of foreign banks and sizeable market share until end 2009 (euro-area benchmark)
- b. Two validation strategies, depending on the settlement procedure
- c. Corridors ECB  $\pm$  25 bps and EONIA  $\pm$  100 bps perform best (in terms of false negatives in the overnight segment 0.92% to 1.96%)
- d. Significant improved results compared to Armantier and Copeland (2012)

### Validation -2/4



#### Cross-check with EONIA data

a. Weighted average rate of all unsecured overnight lending transactions and total volume (euro-area benchmark)

#### Higher turnover identified


- a. Loans concluded on behalf of clients
- b. Tomorrow-next and spot-next transactions included in TARGET2 data
- c. Possible over-identification

#### Lower turnover identified

- a. Loans settled on the accounts of a commercial bank
- b. Transactions settled via another payment system, e.g. EURO1

How to measure the unsecured money market?

### Validation -4/4



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#### Negative interest rates and Furfine

**On 5 June 2014** the Governing Council of the ECB took the decision of decreasing the interest rate on the deposit facility to -0.10%.

In principle, negative interest rates do not impair the ability of our Furfine methodology to identify money market trades from settlement data

However, some concerns arise for those market trades agreed exactly at zero b.ps.

#### Negative interest rates and Furfine

Given the relatively high number of round payments, by enlarging the corridors we could identify spurious contracts agreed at zero b.ps. even when interest rates are high.

Now, we know for sure that a certain number of contracts have been traded at zero b.ps. over the last months.

If we took on board all zero b.ps. contracts identified, we would incur the risk of serious over identification and vice versa.



### Need to refine the methodology

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# Thank you for your attention!